Sweden's income distribution for the whole population and for subgroups, including its immigrants, has been extensively studied. The interest in this area has grown with increasing availability of data, including panels. The previous studies are based on indices of inequality or mobility. While indices are useful for complete ordering and have an air of "decisiveness" about them, they lack universal acceptance of the value judgements inherent to the welfare functions that underlay any index. In contrast, uniform partial order relations are studied in this paper which rank welfare situations over very wide classes of welfare functions. We conduct bootstrap tests for the existence of first and second order stochastic dominance amongst Sweden's income distributions over time and for several subgroups of immigrants. Analysis of immigrant's income is motivated by the fact that the development of income for immigrants has been different and strongly affected by their length of residence and countries of origin. We consider several non-consecutive waves of a panel of incomes in Sweden. Two income definitions are developed. One is pre-transfers and taxes, gross income, the other is a post-transfers and taxes, disposable income. The comparison of the distribution of these two variables affords a partial view of Sweden's welfare system. We have focused on the incomes of Swede's and immigrant groups of single individuals identified by country of origin, length of residence, age, education, gender, marital status and other relevant characteristics. We find that first order dominance is rare, but second order relations hold in several cases, especially amongst disposable income distributions. Sweden's incomes and welfare policies favor the elderly, females, larger families, and longer periods of residency. We find, in general, the higher the educational credentials, the higher is the burden of this equalization policy.
INTRODUCTION
Sweden's income distribution for the whole population and for subgroups, including its immigrants, has been extensively studied. The interest in this area has grown with increasing availability of panels of data. Some attention has also been paid to income dynamics and mobility. See Creedy, Hart and Klevmarken (1980) , Björklund (1993) , Palme (1995) , and Zandvakili and Gustafsson (1998) . All these studies are based on indices of inequality or mobility; See Gustafsson (1994) . While indices are useful for complete ordering and have an air of "decisiveness" about them, they lack broad acceptance of their underlying value judgements. This lack of consensus is problematic for policy analysis and decision making. When Lorenz or Generalized Lorenz (GL) curves of incomes cross, it is possible to portray contradictory pictures of inequality and "welfare" by different choices of indices of inequality or mobility. In addition, indices are summary measures and, therefore, often fail to reveal the finer details at different income levels, and for different population groups. This is inadequate for informed and targeted policy decisions.
Uniform partial order relations can be studied, however, which rank welfare situations over very wide classes of welfare functions. This type of welfare analysis avoids overly narrow cardinalization of welfare functions as is done by indices. Stochastic dominance relations require far less degrees of normative cardinalization. These relations also consider the whole distributions of outcomes, and so are able to reveal crucial details, and potentially important distinctions between different parts of the distribution. Fortunately, we can now conduct statistical tests for the existence of such order relations. If dominance relations are inferred, one has discovered a significant result toward consensus building, it would be redundant to search over inequality indices. We will have discovered dominated "strategies", policies, programs, and distributions. If dominance is not found, one has discovered an equally significant result bearing on the meaning and even the value of index based welfare orderings and pronouncements. Lack of dominance relations means that welfare functions cross, and that, in turn, means that the choice of any index is very subjective and must be rigorously defended as a "majority" decision in specific situations.
The literature on this general topic is rich both within the "income inequality" tradition, as well as in a number of "causal" studies that have empirically examined the possible sources of "earnings mobility" and "wage dispersion". As examples in the latter tradition, Thomas (1995, 1996) and Montgomery and Stockton (1994) attribute wage dispersion to changes in employment in the durable manufacturing sector and investment in computer equipment, as well as the variance in the quality of labor and capital intensities across the sectors within manufacturing. Card (1996) and Bluestone (1990) investigate the impact of age/education and schooling, as well as industrial restructuring on wage dispersion. Among other studies of interest are Lindbeck and Snower (1996) who outline a theory that considers the versatility of work, the dispersion of wages by occupation and education, Gottchalk and Moffitt (1994) who argue that a growing "instability" in wages is causing the observed dispersion in wages, and Blau and Kahn (1996) who conduct a comparative study of wage dispersion among ten countries. Also see Pierce (1991, 1993) . This is all index based.
The analysis in the wage dispersion literature is predominantly based on an index, namely the "variation" in a welfare attribute (earnings). As was established by the early debate on stochastic dominance (SD) vs "mean-variance" analysis, only for (near?) Gaussian and/or quadratic utility functions would the latter rankings be equivalent to SD rankings.
While econometric analysis is largely dependent on explaining "variation", unless broader dominance relations hold, other indices can be found to contradict any welfare rankings implied by variances. Lacking consensus, the econometric findings remain unconvincing.
It seems that there is a wide chasm between a degree of clarity in modern welfare theory, on the one hand, and the welfare underpinnings (or lack thereof) of even the best practice econometric analysis of "earnings mobility" or "wage dispersion", on the other.
Panel data and related techniques in this literature have been very promising with regard to identifying statistical "causes" and other conditioning attributes. We now pay much more attention to dynamics specification and endogeneity aspects of panel data models. But one might ask: What is being explained by these models? What is the effect? And, not surprisingly, we find that "causal" econometric models generally explain "variation" in the dependent variable, earnings or earnings growth, say. In the welfare context it is reasonably safe to say that "variation" or "variance" have very dubious welfare standing. Dramatically different populations (distributions) may have identical or nearly identical variances. The welfare function underlying variance is dismissed out of hand by a comfortable majority of welfare theorists and philosophers.
For instance, one might agree that earnings "mobility" in the US owes much to skills, education, and women's increasing participation in the labor force. Most everyone would agree that "mobility" is a "good" thing. But very few, almost all of them in a small group of welfare theorists, can tell you what "mobility" is, let alone the sense in which it is "good"! It is doubtful that many would agree to a welfare criterion that celebrates a high probability of millionaires going bankrupt and bankrupts becoming rich, in one period, and vice a versa in the next period. Yet markov chain models determining probabilities of movement, and panel data models "explaining" the statistical covariates in this setting, are essentially limited to explaining the "variation", and implying that it is a good thing. Even movement on the basis of returns to education, say, must have a clearly understood sense in which it is socially desirable.
In a recent survey one of us has offered a synthesis which finds that, so far, the only coherent welfarist definitions for "mobility" are in terms of welfare functions that are increasing and concave. This is Pareto and inequality averse. These are also the very properties that are required in defining First and Second Order Stochastic Dominance (FSD and SSD). Such welfare functions register an increase in well being when there is upward mobility in a community, both in the mean, and toward greater equality (in the Pigou-Dalton sense), see Maasoumi (1998a and 1998b) . Lorenz and Generalized Lorenz (GL) dominance also incorporate the same values. Indeed GL and SSD are formally identical.
In this paper we consider statistical test procedures for first and second order stochastic dominance. The tests studied here are multivariate generalizations of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics when weak dependence is permitted in the processes. We demonstrate this with several waves of a panel of incomes in Sweden. Two income definitions are developed. One is pre-government household gross income, the other is a post-government disposable income in calculation of which all transfer payments and taxes are taken into account. The comparison of the distribution of these two variables allows a partial look at the impact of Sweden's welfare system in this context. Several population subgroups can be studied separately and in comparison with others. We have focused on single individual Swedes and immigrants identified by country of origin, length of residency, age, education, gender, marital status and other characteristics.
In practice, numerical SD rankings often encounter a predictable difficulty since many distributions and (Lorenz) curves cross, making it difficult to be decisive. This has led to the development of higher order dominance conditions that represent increasing degrees of cardinalization.
At the same time, the realization that all such comparisons are based on sample based (typically, nonparametric) estimates of distribution functions (or curves) suggests that such comparisons are fundamentally statistical and should be tested accordingly. Interestingly, the statistical approach tends to deliver more "clear-cut" (statistical) decisions than is possible by numerical analysis! Statistical theory for "ranking" populations has a long history and has developed quite rapidly in the last fifteen years or so. This history is reviewed in Maasoumi (2000) . The basic characteristic of tests for rankings is that of ordered populations and hypotheses. Likelihood ratio and Wald-type tests have been and are being developed. These tests supplement other well known procedures based on one-sided Wilcoxan rank, and the multivariate versions of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. Our two nonparametric tests for First and Second order Stochastic Dominance (FSD and SSD, respectively) have also been studied by McFadden (1989), Klecan, Mcfadden, and McFadden (1991) , and Kaur, Prakasa Rao and Singh (1994) .
These tests require Monte Carlo and bootstrap techniques for implementation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the tests for stochastic dominance, their distributional characteristics and the bootstrap techniques used. In Section 3 the data are presented. Section 4 contains the empirical results and their implications. Section 5 concludes.
TESTS FOR STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE
In testing for Lorenz or GL curve comparisons, the "distances" at a finite number of ordinates are compared. These ordinates are typically represented by quantiles and/or conditional interval means. Thus, the distribution theory of the proposed tests are derived from the existing asymptotic theory for ordered statistics or conditional means and variances. Beach, Davidson, and Slotsve (1995) , and more recently Davidson and Duclos (1998) outlined the asymptotic distribution theory for cumulative/conditional means and variances which are the essential ingredients of Lorenz and GL curves, and in testing for stochastic dominance. To control for the size of the sequence of tests at several points the union intersection (UI) and Studentized Maximum Modulus technique for multiple comparisons must be employed.
More recently several non-parametric tests have been proposed for FSD and SSD which recognize that the underlying distribution functions are unknown and must be estimated. In the spirit of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests, and for the case of i.i.d observations on independent variables (prospects), Kaur et al (1994) propose a consistent test of SSD which also depends on the union intersection methodology.
Alternatives to these multiple comparison techniques have been suggested which are typically based on Wald type joint tests of equality of the same ordinates, see Bishop, Chow and Formby (1994) and Anderson (1996) . Xu, Fisher and Wilson (1995) , and Xu (1995) take proper account of the inequality nature of such hypotheses and adapt econometric tests for inequality restrictions to testing for FSD and SSD, and to GL dominance, respectively. Their tests follow the work in econometrics of Gourieroux et al (1982) , Kodde and Palm (1986) , and Wolak (1991) . The asymptotic distributions of these χ − bar squared tests are mixtures of chi-squared variates with probability weights which can be difficult to compute. The computation of the χ − bar squared statistic requires Monte Carlo or Bootstrap estimates of covariance matrices, as well as inequality restricted estimation which requires optimization with quadratic programming. McFadden (1989) and Klecan, McFadden, and McFadden (1991) have proposed tests of first and second order "maximality" for stochastic dominance which are extensions of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. McFadden (1989) assumed i.i.d . observations and independent variates, and derived the asymptotic distribution of the test, in general, and its exact distribution in some cases (see Durbin (1973 Durbin ( , 1985 , and Kaur et al (1994) ). Klecan et al (1991) study this test by allowing for general weak dependence within the processes, and exchangeability between the variables. They demonstrate with an application to ranking investment portfolios. We use a bootstrap implementation of these tests in this paper. In the following subsections some definitions and results are summarized which help to describe our tests. 
Definitions and Tests
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for all x in the support of X, with strict inequality for some x. 
, for all u U ∈ 2 , with strict inequality for some u.
, for all x in the support of X and Y, with strict inequality for some x.
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Let the Lorenz curve of X, say, be defined as L x XdF t
, and its
. The latter was introduced by Shorrocks (1983) . Most measures of inequality are "relative" since they only prize equality, not the levels of incomes. Lorenz 7 curves represent such measures. To prize both levels and equality, comparisons would be made by GL which reflects members of the class of increasing and equality preferring (concave) welfare functions defined above. When either Lorenz or Generalized Lorenz
Curves of two distributions cross, unambiguous ranking by FSD and SSD is not possible.
Whitmore introduced the concept of third order stochastic dominance (TSD) in finance, see (e.g.) Whitmore and Findley (1978) . Shorrocks and Foster (1987) showed that the addition of a "transfer sensitivity" requirement leads to TSD ranking of income distributions. This requirement is stronger than the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers since it makes regressive transfers less desirable at lower income levels. TSD is defined as follows: (
for all u U ∈ 3 , with strict inequality for some u.
0 , for all x in the support, with strict inequality for some x, with the end-point condition: Davies and Hoy (1996) .
When n = 1, Shorrocks and Foster (1987) show that X TSD Y if (a) the Lorenz curve of X cuts that of Y from above, and
The tests of FSD and SSD are based on empirical evaluations of conditions (2) 
, , ....., , be the observed data. We assume X n .
is strictly stationary and α − mixing . As in Klecan et al (1991) , we also assume
, , ....., are exchangeable random variables, so that our resampling estimates of the test statistics converge appropriately. This is less demanding than the assumption of independence which is not realistic in many applications (as in before and after tax scenarios). We also assume F k is unknown and estimated by the empirical distribution function F X kN k ( ) . Finally, we adopt the mathematical regularity conditions pertaining to von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) utility functions that generally underlie the expected utility maximization paradigm. We also assume that all the expectations involved are finite. The following theorem defines our tests and the hypotheses being tested:
Theorem 2.1. Given the mathematical regularity conditions;
(a) The variables in AE are first-order stochastically maximal; i.e.,
if and only if for each i and j, there exists a continuous increasing function u such that
(b) The variables in AE are second order stochastically maximal; i.e.,
[ ]
if and only if for each i and j, there exists a continuous increasing and strictly concave
(c) Assuming the stochastic process X n . , n N = 1 2 , , ....., , to be strictly stationary and
, for some δ > 1 , we have: 
Proof. See Theorems 1. and 5 of Klecan et al (1991) .
The null hypothesis tested by these two statistics is that, respectively, AE is not first (second) order maximal--i.e., X i FSD (SSD) X j for some i and j. We do not reject the null when the statistics are negative to a statistical degree of confidence. Since the null hypothesis in each case is composite, power is conventionally determined in the least favorable case of
As is shown in Kaur et al (1994) and Klecan et al (1991) , when But, as is also noted by Klecan et al (1991) , the sample-based test statistics have, in general, neither a tractable distribution, nor an asymptotic distribution for which there are convenient computational approximations. The situation for d N 2 is somewhat better in some special cases----see Durbin (1973 Durbin ( , 1985 , and McFadden (1989) who assume i.i.d.
observations (not crucial), and independent variables in AE (consequential). Unequal sample sizes may be handled as in Kaur et al (1994) .
In this paper we estimate the empirical distributions by bootstrap methods. In our algorithm we compute d N The data are divided into two groups, Swedes (235814) and immigrants (156954). A number of time invariant characteristics are used to group individuals. These are, gender (male and female), age intervals (18-40, 41-65, 65-105) , level of education (secondary, high school, university), years of immigration to Sweden (1968 Sweden ( -70, 1971 Sweden ( -80, 1981 We find a positive relationship between the productive age and the mean and dispersions of the levels of income, transfers and taxes. The male segment earns on average a higher gross income but the difference shrinks when the disposable income is considered.
Females receive higher transfers although they have a higher frequency of non-zero income than males. In general more females are in part time employment and are paid lower salaries.
The immigrants' mean income and transfers (taxes) increase with the length of their residence. The large dispersion in incomes and transfers by years of immigration can be due to high frequency of pre-retirements among immigrants entering Sweden in the earlier years.
Recent waves of immigrants are more "skilled" in terms of education. When the distribution of income by country of origin is considered, the net transfer (transfers-taxes) is negative for the Swedes and other Nordic countries, while it is positive for the European and other (Middle East, North African and Latin American) countries. In terms of both types of incomes the divorced and unmarried appear "better off" than the widow/widowers. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

The whole distribution over time
The first panel of Table 1 gives some statistical summaries, including the number of observations. In the second panel our test statistics are summarized by their mean and standard errors, as well as the probability of the test being negative. All of these are from 1000 bootstrap samples. The first group is denoted the "X" distribution, and the second by "Y". Thus, "FSDxoy" denotes "first order stochastic dominance of X over Y", "SSDxoy" is similarly defined for second order dominance, "FOmax" and "SOmax" denotes the "first and second order maximality" test, and so on. (1982, 1986, and 1990 ) which shed light on the movement of the overall income distributions over the time period in our sample frame. Depending on the economic conditions and political majority, the time patterns of dominance might be different than the current one which is valid for non-consecutive selected years of observation.
Mean incomes are seen to be increasing while variances are also increasing for both 
Test results for age groups
The results for the age groups (18-40, 41-65 and 65-105) are similarly separated for Swedes and immigrants. The most notable result in Table 2 is in terms of disposable incomes:
All the disposable incomes are maximal, they cannot be ranked by FSD or SSD. There is week evidence for FSD (hence SSD) of the oldest immigrant group's disposable income over the corresponding middle group (with .899 probability).
The welfare programs have been welfare equalizing between age groups. This is evidenced by observing several cases of FSD and SSD between the gross incomes. For example, the Swedes in the two younger age groups SSD the oldest (and are maximal between themselves). For the immigrants, this phenomenon is even stronger: every younger group First order dominates its older group (s) before taxes and transfers. Because of potential biases in the simple percentile bootstrap, the .97 probability for FSD of the youngest group over the middle group may be marginal. It may be safer to say that the youngest group SSD the middle group. Also, since our samples include only "singles", it would be interesting to investigate whether these results hold for the whole population. Table 3 gives the results of our tests for grouping according to the "marital status" of the individuals. Although individuals are all singles we can distinguish a few groups which we expect to differ in their income distributions and well being. The sample is divided into unmarried, divorced and widow/widower. Table 3 shows that the unmarried, "true singles", are better off than the divorced and widowed singles, in that order, before taxes and transfers. This inference is based on strong evidence of SSD for both Swedes and immigrants, and weaker evidence for FSD. Almost all of this evidence disappears after taxes and transfers, with one exception: only the divorced single Swedes FSD the Swede widows. The divorced Swedes do not lose their pre-tax advantage, they enhance it a little with taxes and transfers. By this standard, the "unmarried immigrants" do very badly by the welfare system.
Test results for marital status
Test results for countries of origin
In Table 4 we look at the comparisons by country of origin. The group of Swedish single individuals is used as a control group. In terms of gross incomes, there is only one FSD Relation. Other Nordic FSD European. This relation is unchanged by taxes and transfers.
"Other Nordic" immigrants SSD Swedes, but are maximal with "other" immigrants. Indeed, there is weak evidence (.93 probability) that they are dominated by the "other" group in the SSD sense. Swedes and "others" are maximal in their gross incomes. The gross incomes are thus approximately ranked as, "other Nordic" and "others" slightly better than Swedes who are slightly better off than the "European" immigrants. It would be interesting to extend this study by controlling for age as well as other attributes.
Turning to disposable incomes, Swedes and "other Nordic" groups are maximal amongst themselves, and strongly dominate other groups in the FSD sense (the exception is that Swedes SSD Europeans. European and "other" immigrants are now unrankable. The welfare system benefits from the tax and transfers with the "other" immigrants, and transfers to singles in other groups. Table 5 has the same design as the previous tables but reports our tests for three different education levels. First we note the strong returns to educational credentials. In terms of gross incomes, there is a strong FSD ranking of higher educational credentials over the lower ones. The only weak exception is amongst the immigrants of High school and university degrees. Given the value of the SSD test, however, it is likely that, for this group, third order dominance would hold at a higher probability.
Grouping by Education
Disposable income distributions indicate that the net effect of transfers and taxes is to
decrease the mean disposable income of the two more "educated" groups, and increase that of the least educated. The variance for all groups has decreased significantly as a result of taxes paid and benefits received.
The dominance statistics indicate that, for Swedes, there is a notable welfare equalization amongst educational levels, with the university educated bearing the brunt of taxes and transfers. For the immigrant groups, this reversal of welfare fortunes is even stronger as there are now several FSD relations amongst the disposable income distributions (the two groups with less than university experience are only SSD ranked). Table 6 summarizes the findings for individuals with no children, with one, and with 2 or more children. Having one child is "better" than two or more children, but individuals with no child are equally ranked with the other groups. For immigrants, and in terms of disposable incomes, however, having more children is SSD over fewer and no children, respectively. The welfare system has a clear equalizing benefit for immigrants with children.
Number of children
Interestingly, this is not so for Swedes as all the disposable income distributions are maximal!
Test results for years of immigration
The It may be argued that immigrants expect to find a "better life" when they immigrate. It is equally plausible to expect that their lot will improve with time if they succeed and stay. It is also true that more recent immigrants are more skilled or better off when they become resident. Table 7 sheds some light on these issues. Clearly, the length of residence is positively related to mean incomes, whether gross or disposable. For all groups, the mean incomes are reduced after taxes and transfers.
The test results indicate, however, that there are no significant order relations in terms of gross incomes. But after the welfare effects are taken into account, all of the more established groups dominate the more recent groups in the SSD sense. Greater length of residency is favored by the system, especially when equality (SSD) is the criterion. Table 8 indicates that the mean gross incomes of males are greater than females'.
Test results for gender
This disparity is greatly reduced for the mean disposable incomes. Note that our income measure here is an aggregate of incomes over the entire period. Thus some aspects of mobility are taken into account over this period of time. Because of this, there is no notable disparity between Swedes and immigrants of the same gender. There is a great reduction in the variances of incomes, however, after taxes and transfers are included.
In terms of gross incomes both Swede and immigrant male distributions SSD the female gross distributions. In fact, the immigrant males' gross income FSD the immigrant female distribution. Immigrant males are uniformly better off than immigrant females before taxes. But, there is too much dispersion in the Swedish male distribution of gross incomes for it to FSD the corresponding distribution for females. After taxes and transfers, however, all of these dominance relations are wiped away. There is a gender maximality. The only significant second order dominance in existence is that of Swedish males over immigrant males. This would seem to be a remarkable success if the intended purpose of the welfare policies has been to bring about welfare parity between male and females.
Graphs:
Several graphs are given at the end of the paper that correspond to the table results discussed in the previous sections. Strictly speaking, cdf graphs should be compared only for the same income definition, gross incomes with gross incomes, disposable ones with disposable incomes. This is because the income ranges used for testing are different for every pair of distributions so as to achieve the widest coverage in their supports.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The potential for conducting meaningful statistical ranking of welfare situations is clearly very good. The bootstrap and other resampling tools can be profitably used in the difficult case of inequality restrictions, such as stochastic dominance relations, where even asymptotic approximations are difficult. The use of unrestricted bootstrap confidence intervals in our inferences is a useful innovation when it is difficult to impose the null restrictions in nonparametric settings. Statistical ranking is sound and, somewhat surprisingly, rather decisive in many cases.
In this paper we consider statistical test procedures for first and second order stochastic dominance. Previous studies suggests that bootstrap is an attractive alternative to the existing approximate asymptotic inference methods. The comparison of the distribution of the two income variables in our study allows a partial look at the impact of Sweden's welfare system in this context. Several population subgroups are studied separately and in comparison with others. We have focused on single individual immigrants identified by country of origin, length of residency, age, education, gender, marital status and other characteristics.
Our results suggest that although the sample of singles studied is a small and relatively homogeneous segment of the population of individuals, we observe some clear patterns of economic well being. We find that first order dominance is rare, but second order dominance holds in several cases. An extension of the sample to incorporate groups of individuals targeted for various tax and public transfer policy measures would shed additional light on the state of welfare of individuals and the impact of those policies implemented. This is important in the design and evaluation of welfare programs.
Taxes and public transfers are shown to be effective measures in reducing the variance of disposable income. The contribution to the welfare of households with children, specially the Lone Mothers and the aged population, those with less educational credentials, and generally less able, is an important corner stone in the Swedish welfare system.
A further significance of our results is that they allow a proper interpretation of inequality studies and impressions based on indices of inequality and mobility.
Data and Definition of Variables:
Income: Includes zero incomes. Period: 1982 Period: -1990 . Sample: Single individual with/without children. Observations: balanced panel of 43724 individuals, 393516 observations. Gross Income = (labor income + capital income + temporary employment + agriculture -losses) Transfers = (base pension + additional pension + unemployment benefit + labor market training program benefit + housing/rent support benefits + social security benefit + 1/2 student loans + etc ..) Taxes = Total taxes Disposable Income = (Gross Income + Transfers -Taxes) All variables are given in SEK and transformed to 1990 prices using consumer price index. 1968-1970 (x) vs 1971-1980 (y) 
Glossary of Tests:
